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PUniNG EXPERTS IN THEIR PLACE: THE CHALLENGE OF EXPANDING
PARTICIPATION WHILE SOLVING PROBLEMS
Thad Williamson*
ABSTRACT. This essay critically examines possibilities for expanding
democratic participatory governance in light of Mark Bevir's treatment of the
subject in his book Democratic Governance. Ihe essay argues that a theory
of participatory governance should retain an explicit role for expert analysis,
and that the appropriate scope given to such analysis will vary by policy area.
The essay also argues that the present organization of capitalist economies
mandates a heavy reliance on experts, and that a full-blown account of
expanding participatory governance thus must be paired with an account of
how to achieve a more democratic political economy. Such an account
should also specify how democratic-minded public officials can contribute to
greater public participation in policymaking.
INTRODUCTION
Mark Bevir's Democratic Governance öfters both a nuanced
account of and a robust challenge to prevailing theories of
governance. Bevir öfters an excellent critique of market-oriented New
Public Management theories of government reform, and also quite
properly takes to task those political scientists who are willing to
dilute democracy in order to justify the status quo. Perhaps more
controversially, Bevir also öfters a critique of the dominant alternative
to the New Public Management paradigm, the new institutionalism,
as well as the reform program it inspired in Tony Blair's New Labour
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Government starting in the late 1990s. Finally, Bevir tries to show
that a serious alternative to expertise-driven theories of governance,
one that takes seriously the radicalism of the basic democratic idea
that ordinary people should rule, is both desirable and plausible.
Democratic Governance does not do enough to flesh out what the
radical democratic alternative might look like in a variety of policy
areas, and in my view the book does not do enough to identify the
enduring obstacles to more participatory arrangements. Nonetheless,
Bevir makes a major contribution by laying the intellectual
groundwork for such a radical alternative—not just by theoretical
reflection, but by detailed engagement with the specifics of policy and
governance, with wide-ranging examples drawn from numerous
advanced democracies. The work of forging alternatives necessarily
begins with a critique of the status quo, and this is what Bevir has
provided with this book.
This essay focuses less on the theoretical basis of Bevir's
arguments-in particular, his advocacy for an "interpretive social
science"—and more on their implications for democratic policy
making, although some discussion of the theoretical issues is
unavoidable. I wish to develop four key points. First, I show how
Bevir's arguments might be enhanced by a more robust insistence on
the primacy of democratic theory as a guide to what governance
should look like. Second, I argue that Bevir has over-stated the
efficacy of ideas in his account and under-stated the role of power,
and in particular the enduring political power of corporate entities
and the impact this has on debates about governance. Third, I
provide a brief defense of giving "expert" knowledge a privileged role
in at least some public policy debates, taking as a case study local,
state, and national policy responses to climate change. Fourth, and
drawing on the previous points in this essay, I argue that in practice,
an effective alternative to market-oriented paradigms should not rely
exclusively on participatory approaches to reform, but rather
strengthened participation in conjunction with leadership from pro-
democratic public officials and Judicious use of expert knowledge.
THE PRIMACY OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Bevir's central argument in Democratic Governance involves a
critique of social science and its presumed expertise. The standard
model of representative democracy involves elected representatives
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making policy, informed by expert guidance about policy outcomes.
The basis for this expertise is often social science research purporting
to show how policy interventions impact outcomes (with outcomes
often being understood as human behavior). Bevir charged that the
standard social science model presumes that interventions will have
"certain eftects more or less irrespective of local cultures and local
circumstances." (p. 244). He continued by showing how this
presumption can lead to absurd and even counter-productive results
in the case of police reform, which often has been experienced by on-
the-beat ofticers as an unwelcome and unhelpful intrusion by
outsiders who simply do not understand the pressures of the job and
the pragmatic judgments ofticers must make every day.
Bevir argued that the social science expert paradigm often
produces unintended consequences, precisely by ignoring local
circumstances and the role of "contingency" in human aftairs. I
believe he is correct that many policy researchers invest too much
faith and eftort in employing sophisticated statistical technicjues that
purportedly öfter "proof" of not only statistically significant
correlations but of underlying causal relationships, and not enough
eftort in thinking carefully through how such findings ought to impact
public policy. The temptation is to leap from a finding that (assuming
a certain causal story) a change in variable X is associated with some
percent change in variable Y to the assumption that a particular
policy intervention designed at increasing or reducing X will in fact
lead to corresponding changes in Y, ignoring the complicating
considerations. Potential complications include variations in local
conditions, the possibility that how changes in X come about may
impact its relationship to Y, and the possibility that increases in X may
also have impacts on other variables besides Y significant enough to
be of public concern.
Bevir's critique might be made more nuanced by greater
acknowledgement of the degree to which (at least some) policy
researchers are self-consciously cautious and humble in making
claims about the presumed eftectiveness of particular policy
interventions. Academic policy researchers spend a lot of time
worrying about questions of self-selection, reverse causality, proper
measurement of outcomes, and other common problems in both
establishing correlations and trying to distinguish correlations from
causality within complex systems (Byrne, 2011). They also are
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increasingly mindful of how causal processes may differ from one
context to another. (This is not to say that policy advocates, who
perhaps have had the most practical impact on public policy practice,
are always similarly cautious.)
Bevir might reply that while many policy researchers are aware of
these difficulties, typically they are seen as impediments or
complications in the assumed task of finding a "universal" causal
relationship that is thought to underlie the local variations, an
aspiration that stands at odds with Bevir's interpretive social science.
But the commitment to generalized explanations that dominates the
field of policy research is unlikely to evaporate. Nor is it clear that it
should. Studies of, for instance, the impact of education, race,
gender, and geographical location on life outcomes (employment,
income) and on political behavior can be highly illuminating and form
the basis for a critique—indeed a radical critique—of American society
(and others), even when they fail to capture (or even attempt to
capture) the underlying meaning of the actions being studied. For a
good example (see Wright & Rogers, 2010) Byrne (2011) has simiiar
aspirations for an "emancipatory" social science that is also
rigorously empirical. Citizens and activists in localized policy disputes
often draw on such studies to bolster their claims and challenge
existing local practices. Without access to "authoritative" knowledge
of this kind, activists have few tools with which to challenge the
claims of public officials.
Consider then this alternative approach, which shares the view
that policy researchers often should adopt a more humble
relationship to actual politics but preserves a key role for social
science knowledge. Instead of conceiving of policy research as
offering authoritative guidance on the best policies to pursue, it might
be conceived as offering relevant input into democratic deliberations
over policy directions (Anderson, 1993: Gutmann & Thompson,
1997). And indeed, democratic publics deliberating policy
alternatives will have good reason to seek out expert knowledge.
Does raising the minimum wage really cost the economy jobs? Do
cities benefit economically when they provide subsidies to build
stadiums? What is the best way to preserve affordable housing in
cities undergoing rises in property values? The answers to these
questions are important, and ordinarily almost all citizens will be
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reliant on access to expert knowledge to form a defensible view on
these matters.
The examples provided above all deliberately involve economics.
Put more precisely, they involve questions of how a change in one
part of an inter-connected system (understanding "the market" as
both a set of institutional rules and a set of individual and collective
behaviors in response to those rules) will affect activity in other parts
of the system. The answers to such questions are rarely visible to the
naked eye, and rarely obvious as a matter of a priori theory. Indeed,
good empirical work on these questions can capture precisely those
unintended or countervailing effects unanticipated by theory. Insofar
as the quest of much public policy is to intervene into or re-write the
rules of market systems so as to produce socially desirable results,
maintaining an important role for expertise seems essential-even if it
is agreed that such expertise should play a subordinate role in policy
deliberations.
Bevir's argument that social science expertise as the basis for
policy fails because it overlooks unintended consequences, is thus
not fully convincing. Social scientists can reply that policymaking
uninformed by policy research would create even more unintended
consequences, and that well-designed empirical research can
capture how actual policy interventions fare in the messiness of the
real world. Indeed, one might argue that the real struggle is not
overturning social science's role in policymaking, but in using social
science to challenge ideological or highly theoretical conceptions of
the way markets work in practice. And in some circumstances
(particularly at the local government level), research or simply the
provision of basic facts can provide an important check on elite
claims on matters such as economic development policy. In practical
political terms, I suspect that the crucial issue is whether policy
researchers view themselves and their work as allies to democratic
publics and democratic social movements rather than servants (or
holders!) of power, not whether they are practitioners of modernist or
interpretive social science.
Bevir might have instead developed a stronger argument for
decentering social science expertise, drawn not from claims about its
effects on policy but from democratic theory. Simply put, conventional
social science research often treats persons as subjects to be
manipulated, not as fellow citizens with their own agency. The
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policymaker is placed in the position of attempting to manipulate the
behavior of other people so as to produce desired outcomes. This is
particularly problematic when the subjects of these interventions are
other public agents, such as police ofticers (Bevir's example) or
schoolteachers (another highly pertinent example), and when such
agents are given little or no eftective voice in shaping policy reforms.
Discussion of public education reform in the U.S., for instance, rarely
gives prominent place to the views of actual teachers (let alone
students!), compared to policy scholars or policy entrepreneurs.
Likewise, the common model of urban school reform in the United
States is top-down, both at the local level (the hard-charging
superintendent given the power to "clean up" the status quo) and at
the national level (making testing regimes the basis for urban
education).
This Is not to say that policy can ever entirely avoid the
manipulation Of human behavior by some government actor or
institution. That is what laws and rules involve. Much public policy
revolves around questions of pricing and Incentives, with the
assumed view that people will respond to changes in prices and
incentives in fairly predictable ways. There are two difticulties here,
however. The first is with assuming that more complex forms of
human behavior (beyond buying decisions) can be well-modeled or
predicted with economistic assumptions. The second is with
assuming that the predictions of accumulated social science research
necessarily should trump the deliberations of democratic publics.
Policymaking might be better conceived as citizens reasoning
together about the content of the laws they wish to live under,
understanding this as a multi-layered process in which judgments
about what prices and what incentives citizens judge as appropriate
are necessarily intertwined with judgments about values (social
justice), local goods (what is important for this particular culture), and
aspirations (what kind of community we want to be).
Conventional policy research can make a vital cohtribution to
this process, so long as it is presented as input for public discussion,
not the authoritative basis for public policymaking. Bevir in fact
articulates—but does not fully develop- a position of this kind in his
discussion of public policy making in Chapter Eight, in which he allows
that "there is no doubt some value" in consulting expert opinion in
shaping policies, but that "[A]fter the experts voice their opinions.
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there has to be a free argument about which policy citizens want to
adopt." (p. 195). This is an attractive picture, and Bevir's arguments
for re-casting the interplay between "experts," public officials, and
citizens could be made both more concrete and more persuasive by
fleshing this account out in future work.
THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: WHAT'S REALLY BEHIND IT?
Bevir did an excellent job deconstructing the ideology of the New
Pubiic Management and showing how inappropriate it can often be to
organize public functions so as to mimic markets. What Bevir did not
do is examine in any depth the connection between New Public
Management ideas and the broader ideology of free-market
conservatism that has come to play a hegemonic role in (especiaily)
the U.S., or the reiationship between either of these ideologies and
capitalism as such. Indeed, while Bevir did provide a fine account of
British socialist and social democratic thought as a backdrop for
understanding New Labour thinking on issues of governance, he did
not engage capitalism as such. Consequently, Bevir's focus was
almost entirely on how government is organized, and not on the role
private interests play in shaping government activity.
This is problematic for four reasons. First, the New Public
Management is not merely a theory of how to reform the state so as
to be more efficient. It is also an ideological attack on the public
sector itself, and on the idea of a democratic public using public
power to promote public ends (Box et ai., 2001). At stake here is the
question of whether government has the capacity to regulate and
steer capitalist economic arrangements so as to achieve desired
social goals. The presumption of neoliberals is not only that modern
states do not have that capacity, but that they should not, because
markets are inherently a more efficient form of social organization
than government. Bevir is spot-on in his critique of this neoliberal
ideology, but does not adequately spell out who stands to gain from
it: powerful corporations who are thereby less constrained in their
capacity to pursue profits, as well as the wealthy, who have less to
fear in the way of redistributive taxes from a weak, discredited state.
The rise of New Pubiic Management theories are only partly a story
about pro-market ideology applied to the public sphere. It is also a
story about the relative distribution of power between the pubiic and
private sector, about the distribution of income and wealth, and often
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(as recently seen in Wisconsin) about weakening the bargaining
power of public sector workers.
Second, partly because Bevir's primary case study is New Labour
government in Britain, he did not call sufticient attention to the
degree to which public policy and the public sector has (especially in
the United States) in many cases eftectively been captured by private
interests. This is most clear cut in the cases of privatization of not
only government services but government infrastructure itself,
thereby creating new profit opportunities. It is also quite evident in
the symbiotic relationship between private contractors and suppliers
and the expansion of the prison industrial complex, as well as the
ongoing (and rarely challenged) military industrial complex. And it is
evident in the tax code and often in the ways regulatory agencies
create, interpret, and enforce rules. Yet Bevir at no point in the text
discusses corporate "capture" of governance functions by business
interests as one of the fundamental problems facing a constructive
theory of democratic governance.
Third, Bevir's account does not give sufticient attention to the
degree to which governments in capitalist nations are constrained by
the need to keep capitalist economies well-functioning, that is,
constantly growing. That constraint in itself has powerful implications
for how much democracy is possible in economic policymaking within
capitalist systems. If the health of the state and social order depend
on a constantly growing economy, then it is natural to conclude that
the economy is just too important not to be left to experts, and for the
levers of economic policymaking to be tightly controlled in institutions
such as the Federal Reserve. At the sub-national level, states and
localities are typically constrained in public policy by the need to
attract or retain mobile capital investment in order to maintain the
health of local economies. This in turn means public policy at these
levels are typically biased towards the interests of corporations, not
only because they often have greater capacity and incentive to
influence policy than ordinary persons but because they possess a
threat power—the threat to shift investment elsewhere—that local and
state-level politicians must take very seriously. Indeed, in many
localities, it never occurs to public ofticials to consider deviations
from the standard menu of pro-business policies (holding labor costs
down, providing subsidies to economic development projects,
keeping tax rates low, streamlining regulations). This analysis in turn
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suggests the enduring importance of concepts like "social class" and
the "social logic attached to capitalist development" in understanding
the obstacles to a more participatory democracy—concepts that
Bevir's interpretive social science would have us eschew as principal
explanatory tools (pp. 58-60).
These points feed into my fourth observation. If the above
observations have merit, the implication is that capitalist economic
arrangements place substantial if not severe limits on the amount of
radical democracy that states can responsibly adopt. Participatory
arrangements may be possible in discrete, localized areas such as
local budgeting, police oversight, and school administration. But to
broaden participation to the most fundamental questions of
economic policy would require not only a new approach to
governance but an account of what a substantially reformed political
economy would look like. Indeed, the fact that contemporary
capitalism seems to require centralized, non-transparent control of
policymakers at the head of central banks and other monetary
institutions, and that the policies adopted are typically heavily shaped
by the views of economic elites, should count as a major argument
against existing political-economic arrangements. Put another way,
the problem of democratic governance cannot be detached from the
fundamental question of how the political economy itself is to be
organized.
IN (PARTIAL) DEFENSE OF EXPERTS
Indeed, Bevir sided with those who would prioritize democratic
process over "social justice." This prioritization is offered as a critique
of those within the Labour Party who claim expert knowledge about
how capitalist economies work and envision making that knowledge
the basis of policy. As already suggested, I am not convinced of
Bevir's dismissal of the need for expert analysis of modern capitalist
economies. To make a modern capitalist economy run well and
deliver an acceptable distribution of goods is no easy task. To
understand the contemporary financial crisis in more than trivial or
moralistic terms requires a serious analysis of capitalism's longer-
term trajectory, which requires serious effort. I certainly do not think
that it is beyond the ordinary citizen to have a sufficiently detailed
knowledge of macroeconomics to make an informed judgment about
policy direction, but it is also the case that many citizens in the U.S.
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and elsewhere lack such understanding and are prone to thinking
about the macro-economy in terms of patently inappropriate
metaphors (i.e. "we have to pay our own bills, government should as
well.") A Labour government with a failing macroeconomic policy likely
will be a failed government full stop. It is certainly possible to
envisage much, much greater public participation and deliberation
regarding questions such as what kinds of social investments society
should undertake, but again, this requires thinking carefully through
how a democratic economy might be organized (Wright 2011; O'Neill
& Williamson, 2012).
Now consider a second major area of public policy in which
expertise is unavoidable: climate change and environmental policy
more generally. It should not require detailed argument to show that
a polity that combines participatory formation of climate-relevant
policy with widespread scientific illiteracy will not choose wisely when
it comes to climate change. The policies such a polity will choose wili
not honor principles of social justice or respect the prudence of the
precautionary principle. Instead, they will tend to be inadequate,
unjust, and ultimately self-destructive. The picture gets bleaker still
when we remember the role of organized interests (i.e., big oil) in
debates about climate policy and their capacity to stir up doubt and
skepticism about scientifically valid evidence.
Again, this is a policy area where the obvious diagnosis seems to
be that we need a greater rather than lesser role for experts in
shaping policy. Bevir might argue that this represents a special sort of
case, but such a rejoinder would not be convincing: if climate change
scientists are correct than almost all of our public policies need to be
re-assessed in terms of the need to dramatically reduce carbon
emissions as soon as possible. Likewise, if climate change scientists
are correct the need to assure uniform, system-wide compliance with
carbon-conserving rules should trump concerns about respecting
local conditions, and the need for rapid action should trump concerns
about achieving deliberative consent to such action. Moreover, the
substance of much climate change policy will involve deliberate
attempts to steer human behavior in some directions rather than
others, by increasing the price of fossil fuel use and ending or
reversing subsidies for carbon intensive residential and travel
patterns. Achieving coordinated action on a national basis implies
that all localities must adopt common standards, rather than allow
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some localities to try to gain a short-term economic advantage by
having less exacting environmental standards than other localities.
In at least two major policy areas then-economic policy and
environmental policy—there are, in my view, very strong reasons for
continuing to give expertise a privileged role in the policy process-
indeed, arguably a more privileged position than is currently the case.
It is exceedingly unclear how a more participatory form of economic
policy might be devised, at least in the absence of a corresponding
account of a radically reformed, democratic economy. It is also
exceedingly unclear how nations can respond to the urgent realities
of climate change without quite a lot of dependence on old school,
Westminster-style coordination of policy actions defined at the center
and implemented in top-down fashion. There may be as many good
ways to reform schools or monitor the police force as there are
localities in the United States, but the same is not true with respect to
minimizing carbon impact as soon as possible.
COMBINING PARTICIPATION WITH POWER AND EXPERTISE
These considerations lead me to argue that we should not look to
more participatory institutions alone in rethinking a form of
democratic governance capable of meeting the dramatic policy
challenges of the 21st century. First, advocates of reform need to
provide a taxonomy of what sort of policy areas are most amenable to
radical democratic arrangements, and which policy areas will
necessarily be informed in large measure by either social scientific or
scientific expertise. Such a taxonomy should further distinguish
between cases in which the role of expert knowledge should be
merely to provide evidence, when it should provide advice on actual
policies, and when experts should be allowed or requested to actually
craft the policies themselves. This last scenario should be more the
exception than the rule. The presumption should be in favor of
expanding the role of public participation and citizen judgment-
drawing on dialogue with experts who supply information and
alternative perspectives, but do not decide the matter-whenever this
is feasible. Second, advocates of reform need to identify clearly the
political obstacles to achieving more democratic forms of governance,
including most especially the role of private interests (and the
"expert" knowledge they deploy.)
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Third, some account needs to be given of the role public officials
can play in instigating democratic reform. As Richard Box has argued,
pubiic officials can play a major role in calling public attention to
issues and putting democratic, participatory processes into motion
(Box, 2005). They can also develop strategies for how to cope with
the obstacles to implementing policies favored by democratic publics.
Most importantly, perhaps, they can recognize the systemic biases
embedded in contemporary governance processes which favor the
well-resourced and well-connected over those excluded from the
policy process, and think proactively and creatively about how to
counter those biases.
In short, I am convinced by Janet and Robert Denhardt's
insistence (described by Bevir) that we cannot do without truly
publicly minded public servants, who see their role not as
implementing wise policies in top-down fashion but in calling
attention to and helping mobilize actions around critical issues
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011). While systemic reform to create new
radically democratic structures is desirable in many policy areas, we
should not overlook or neglect the critical role pro-democratic public
officials can play, even within traditional governance structures, in
making government accessible to citizens and in showing why
engagement is worthwhile. Indeed, democratically-minded public
officials and citizen movements can have a potentially symbiotic
relationship: increasing participation and deliberation can help build
legitimacy for more extensive, proactive public sector policy action
that makes it more likely public officials can implement desirable
policies; having access to power and to decision makers similarly
lends a credibility to grassroots groups, indicating that their voices will
be more than Just heard, but will in fact help shape policy.
CONCLUSION
Re-legitimizing strong public sector action must be a central aim
of both advocates for greater democracy and participation and
advocates for social Justice. I concur with Bevir's view that radical,
participatory alternatives in which citizens weigh evidence, deliberate
over possible outcomes, and help shape policy provide a potential
advance over conventional modes of governance. Likewise, while I
have defended preserving a significant role for "expert" knowledge in
public policy debates in this essay, Bevir's basic idea that thinking
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about the policy process in terms of dialogue and storytelling opens
the door to much wider participation by citizens than conventional
expert-centric models is compelling. But much careful thought is
needed to distinguish between what policy arenas should be
constructed on a more participatory model and which must retain a
strong and on occasion decisive role for appropriate kinds of
expertise. Likewise, careful thought must be given to which policy
areas can be safely distributed among many difterent local
governments acting on the basis of local knowledge and which policy
areas necessarily require uniform policies regardless of local
conditions.! (Here I assume that the lower the scale of government at
which a decision is made, the greater scope there will be for
extensive public participation and for individuals and small groups to
have a tangible impact. This is not to say there is no scope for
expanding participation at higher levels of government). Finally, an
account of reform must both identify the agents and interests likely to
be opposed to such change, and develop a political strategy for either
winning over, neutralizing, or side-stepping such opposition. I hope
that Bevir and his readers will take up these tasks in future work.
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NOTES
1. "Local knowledge" is not to be confused with the very difterent
concept Bevir introduced of "local reasoning," in which the term
"local" does not have a geographic connotation but rather means
"local to a web of beliefs" (Bevir, 2010, p. 262).
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